Supreme Court Summarizes Principles Governing The Grant Of Leave To First And Second Appeal Under CP

Supreme Court Clarifies Principles for Granting Leave to Appeal Under CPC

 

In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, laid down key principles regarding the grant of leave to appeal under Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC. The judgment in H. Anjanappo & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 1180-1181 and 1182-1183 of 2025) arose from a dispute over a property sale, where subsequent purchasers challenged a decree of specific performance.

 

Case Background

 

The case stemmed from an agreement of sale executed in 1995. The original owner had agreed to sell the property to the plaintiffs (appellants), but later transferred it to third parties despite a subsisting injunction. When the trial court decreed specific performance in favor of the plaintiffs, the subsequent purchasers (respondents) sought to challenge the decision. Their attempt to implead themselves in the suit was rejected in 2014, a decision they never appealed. However, after the decree, they approached the Karnataka High Court for leave to appeal, which was granted despite a delay of 586 days.

 

Key Legal Issues

 

The Supreme Court examined:

 

The rights of subsequent purchasers in appealing a specific performance decree.

 

The application of the lis pendens doctrine under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.

 

The interpretation of "person aggrieved" under Sections 96 and 100 CPC.

 

The interplay of Section 146 CPC (proceedings by or against representatives) with Order XXII Rule 10 CPC (continuation of suits by transferees).

 

 

Supreme Court’s Ruling

 

The Court set aside the High Court’s order, holding that the respondents had no right to appeal after their impleadment was rejected and had attained finality. It emphasized that:

 

A lis pendens transferee can seek leave to appeal, but only if their legal rights are substantially affected.

 

The term "person aggrieved" does not include those with only remote or psychological grievances.

 

Leave to appeal should be granted judiciously and not as a matter of right.

 

A rejected impleadment plea does not automatically bar a party from appealing, but it may operate as res judicata.

 

Appellate courts should not condone excessive delays without valid reasons.

 

 

The Court ultimately ruled that the respondents, being bound by the doctrine of lis pendens, had no legal standing to challenge the decree. Their remedy, if any, lay in seeking compensation from their vendor, not in contesting the specific performance decree.

 

This decision reinforces the principle that appeals cannot be used to circumvent established legal finality, especially when the claimants have been passive in protecting their rights.